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INTRODUCTION 
\ 
Suppose we have a population of homogeneous individuals, 
whose living standards are adecuately represented by a one-dimensional 
variable we will call income. Traditionally, in welfare economics we are 
interested in evaluation methods which take into account efficiency 
preference for larger incomes, and equity preference for less vertical 
inequality. Moreover, we want our methods to require a minimum of 
value judgements. In particular, we want unambigous rankings according 
to which social welfare increases only if efficiency and distribution both 
improve. 
Let us agree that admissible social evaluation functions (SEF for 
short) must satisfy continuity, population replication invariance, and a 
preference for equity represented by the S-concavity axiom. Shorrocks 
(1983) suggests two wide classes of SEFs, depending on an additional 
monotonicity assumption which captures (i) a preference for higher 
incomes maintaining constant a relative notion of inequality, so that the 
proportion of rich and poor individuals does not change; or (ii) a more 
demanding absolute notion, according to which inequality only remains 
constant if every household experiences the same absolute income change. 
Let us denote these two classes by WR and W A' respectively. The merit of 
Shorrocks contribution is that he develops operational methods, based on 
the usual Lorenz curves, to find out whether one distribution is 
unambigously better than another according to all SEFs in WR or W A (1). 
But perhaps there is room to improve upon the present 
methodology. In this paper we side with the minority who argue that 
there are plenty of "centrist" or intermediate views on inequality which 
deserve to be explored, between the "rightist" (relative) or "leftist" 
(absolute) cases in Kolm (1976),s value ladden terminology. The 
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conceptual interest of such views has been enhanced by recent reports on 
questionnaires which indicate that people are by no means unanimous in 
their choice between relative, absolute and other intermediate or centrist 
notions of inequality(2). On the other hand, consider a situation in which 
income distribution y has less relative inequality but more absolute 
inequality than income distribution x. The following empirical question 
cannot be answered with present tools: is distribution y "barely better" 
than x from the relative point of view, and consequently "far away" from 
it from the absolute one; or is "so much better" from the relative 
perspective that is "nearly equivalent" to x from the absolute point of 
view? In other words, present methods only address yes-or-no questions 
relative to the two polar cases, but in situations like in the above example 
are silent on whether the improvement in relative inequality (or the 
worsening of absolute inequality) is "large" or "small". 
In order to provide a certain answer to that question, in this paper 
we introduce a new centrist or intermediate inequality notion, called (x, Jt)-
inequality, depending on an initial income distribution x and a parameter 
value Jt in the unit interval. We say that x and y have the same (x, Jt)-
inequality if the total income difference between the two distributions is 
allocated among the indivuals as follows: Jt percent preserving income 
shares in x, and (1 - Jt) percent in equal absolute amounts. 
Correspondingly, we suggest a monotonicity assumption for SEFs which 
captures a preference for higher incomes maintaining (x, Jt)-inequality 
constant. Let us denote this class of SEFs by W(x, Jt). 
It turns out that (x, Jt)-inequality measures are a variant of the a-
ray invariant inequality measures proposed by Pfingsten and Seidl (1994), 
or PS for short. Our reason for defending the new notion is twofold. In the 
first place, it has a clearer interpretation than a-ray invariant measures, 
but retain some of its good properties which distinguish them from the 
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intermediate inequality notions proposed by Kolm (1976) and Bossert and 
Pfingsten (1992)<3). In the second place, unlike other a-ray invariant 
measures, it can be made operational. Thus, following up on ideas put 
forth in Chakravarty (1988) our methods permit to estimate from the data 
the range of 3t values for which distribution x has more or less (x, 3t)-
inequality than distribution y<4). Then, taking also into account the mean 
income change 'in going from x to y, one can unambigously conclude 
whether distribution y is superior, inferior or non-comparable to 
distribution x for all SEFs in the class W(x, 3t) for this range of 3t values. 
Notice that we do not suggest the "politically correct" (x, n)-inequality 
concept, but find out from the data for which 3t values, say (3tt, 3t2) in the 
interval [0, 1], the two income distributions x and y are (x, 3t)-inequality 
non comparable. For people with attitudes towards inequality represented 
by n values in the interval [O,3tt], there would have been a worsening in 
(x, 3t)-inequality, while for people with attitudes represented in the 
interval [n2' 1], there would have been an improvement. 
So far, we have been dealing with the homogeneous case in 
which all individual incomes are comparable. In practice, we must 
recognize that individuals come grouped in households with different 
non-income needs. Our methods can be readily extended to the 
heterogeneous case. For that purpose, we should first decide which 
household characteristics ought to be taken as ethically relevant for social 
evaluation purposes. Then, interhousehold welfare comparisons must be 
made consistently with the relative, absolute or intermediate inequality 
concept we care to use. 
In Del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo (1995) we applied standard procedures 
to the evolution of the standard of living in Spain between 1980-81 and 
1990-91, an interesting period in this country, in which a socialist party 
occupied power by democratic means for the first time in 40 years. 
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Household size was taken as the only household characteristic defining 
ethically relevant non-income needs. To pool all households in a 
common distribution, we followed Coulter et al (1992a, 1992b) and 
parametrized the role to be given to household size in our definition of 
adjusted or equivalent income. Finally, following up on recent 
developments(S), when comparing Lorenz curves proper procedures of 
statistical inference were adscribed to throughout. The main results for the 
population as a whole, as well as within each homogeneous household 
type, were as follows. There has been: (i) an important growth in mean 
household expenditure in real terms; (ii) an statistically significant 
reduction in relative inequality; (iii) an increase in absolute inequality. 
These results provide us with a text-book example suggesting an 
application of a centrist approach. 
The main results obtained from this approach, using our notion of 
(x, x)-inequality and taking x as the 1980-81 distribution, are as follows. (i) 
For the population as a whole, when economies of scale in consumption 
are rather important, the range of x values for which both distributions 
are (x, x)-inequality equivalent, is (0.75, 0.90) for both the unweighted case 
and the case in which households are weighted by household size. (ii) Each 
subgroup in the basic partition by household size is also investigated. In 
the subgroup of 3 person households, for which the improvement is 
greatest, the range of Jt values for which both distributions are (x, x)-
inequality equivalent, is (0.52, 0.82) 
The rest of the paper is organized in four. sections. Section I 
presents the a-ray invariant inequality measures suggested by PS, and 
introduces our (x, x)-inequality concept, emphasizing the economic 
interpretation that singles out our notion within the larger class of a-ray 
invariant inequality measures. Section 11 describes how to make 
operational our inequality concept. Section III contains the empirical 
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results in the Spanish case. Section IV concludes. Proofs are included in an 
Appendix. 
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I. RAY INVARIANT INEQUALITY CONCEPTS 
1.1. Notation 
Let x = (xl, ... ,xH)ER~+, 2 s H < 00, denote an income distribution. 
Then D := R~+ denotes the set of all possible income distributions, and S 
the H-dimensional simplex. For any xED, let Vx = (v1, ... ,vH)ES be the 
vector of income shares with vh = xh IX, where X = ~h xh is the aggregate 
income. 1 denotes a row vector whose components are all ones, while e 
denotes the vector (1/H) 1 in S. For any two vectors x, y ED, let vx L Vy 
denote weak Lorenz dominance. 
Any real valued function I defined on D satisfying continuity, S-
convexity and population replication invariance is called an income 
inequality measure. 1(.) satisfies scale invariance when I(x) = I(Ax) for all 
xED and for all A > O. 1(.) satisfies translation invariance when I(x) = I(x + 
111) for all xED and for all llER such that (x + 11l)ED. If an inequality 
measure satisfies scale or translation invariance it is called a relative or an 
absolute inequality measure, respectively. 
1.2 Centrist inequality attitudes 
It can be argued that, for technical or other reasons, the vast 
majority of specialists prefer the relative notion. However, Kolm (1976) 
observed that many people perceive equiproportional increases in all 
incomes to increase, and equal incremental increases in all incomes to 
decrease income inequality. He called such an attitude centrist. As 
indicated in the conclusions to Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo (1993), if because 
of the influence of political attitudes to redistribution or other unkown 
concerns people in large numbers declare to favor absolute or 
intermediate inequality concepts, then perhaps it is time to change the 
consensus and use more often other types of inequality measures, as Kolm 
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himself and Bossert and Pfingsten (1990), for example, have 
recommended. 
As pointed out in PS, a centrist income inequality attitude can be 
modelled in various ways. For all xED, there exists a set of income 
distributions E(x) such that, first, all yEE(x) are perceived to be as equally 
distributed as x, second, for AX > x and (x + 'Y)1) > x all yEE(x) are perceived 
to be more equally distributed than AX and less equally distributed than (x 
+ 'Y)l), and third, for x > AX and x> (x + 'Y)1) all yEE(x) are perceived to be 
less equally distributed than AX and more equally distributed than (x + 'Y)1). 
Given such a centrist inequality attitude, the question arises whether there 
are E-invariant income inequality measures, i.e., I(x) = I(y) for all yEE(x). 
As PS indicate, a straightforward case is to assume E(x) to be 
composed of rays through x. For later reference, the set Ea(x) of a-rays 
through x is defined by 
Ea(x) = {yED: y = x + Ta, TER}. 
In accordance with centrist ideas, PS require a-rays to be restricted in two 
ways: first, they Lorenz dominate the original distribution; and, second, 
they are more unequally distributed than traslation invariance would 
require. Thus, given an income distribution xED, define the set Q(x) of 
value judgements (in income share form) which provide an 
improvement in relative inequality but a worsening in absolute 
inequality relative to x: 
Q(x) = {aES: e La L vxl. 
In other words, given xED and aEQ(x), every yEEa(x) is derived from x by 
superimposing a "more equal" income distribution according to the 
Lorenz criterion. 
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To understand in which sense x and a co-determine the domain of 
a-ray invariant functions, define the set f(a) of income distributions for 
which aES can represent a centrist inequality attitude: 
f(a) = {xED: a L v xl. 
Clearly, if xED and aES but a~Q(x) or x~f(a), then the pair (x, a) does not 
give rise to a centrist inequality relation. Accordingly, a real valued 
function Fa: D -+ R is called a-ray invariant in f(a), if and only if for each 
xEf(a), 
F a(x) = F a(Y) for all yEEa(x). 
Given an a-ray invariant function Ia (.), we say that it is an a-ray invariant 
inequality measure if, in addition, it is is continous, S-convex and satisfies 
the population replication axiom. 
As far as existence is concerned, PS show that for any aES there 
exists a non-empty set of income distributions na) on which Ia (.) is an a-
ray invariant function; and for any xED there exists a non-empty set of 
value judgements Q(x) such that a-ray invariant inequality measures are 
defined for any aEQ(x). 
In general, a-ray invariance requires an inequality measure not to 
change provided any income change is distributed according to the value 
judgement represented by the relative pattern a. Thus, let x = (200, 800), so 
that v x = (0.2, 0.8), and, for example, let a = (0.4, 0.6) so that e L a L v X' 
Then 
2 Ea(x) = {yER++: y = (200,800) + 1:(0.4, 0.6), 1:ER}. 
Therefore, if we have 100 units of extra income to allocate, to preserve 
such a-ray invariance we must add up the vector (40, 60) to x to reach (240, 
860). 
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I.3. Social Evaluation Functions 
A Social Evaluation Function (SEF for short) is a real valued 
function W defined on D, with the interpretation that for each income 
distribution x, W(x) provides the "social" or, simply, the aggregate welfare 
from a normative point of view. In the area of income distribution 
analysis, it is generally agreed upon that SEFs must express, at a 
minimum, social preference for a more equitable profile and higher 
incomes, ceteris paribus. These value judgements are refered to as "equity 
preference" and "efficiency preference" respectively. 
In I.2. we have presented the PS notion of centrist or intermediate 
inequality. We must now incorporate a preference for efficiency. As 
pointed out in the Introduction, Shorrocks (1983) made two suggestions in 
this respect. The first condition is that 
W (AX) <!: W (x) for all scalars A <!: 1, 
that is, welfare improves if all incomes are increased proportionately. This 
corresponds to a preference for higher incomes keeping relative inequality 
constant. The second condition is that 
W (x + 111) <!: W (x) for all scalars 11 <!: 0, 
so that welfare improves if all incomes are increasing by the same 
amount. This corresponds to a preference for higher incomes keeping 
absolute inequality constant. 
The natural extension in our context is as follows. A SEF W: D --+ 
R is called monotonic along a-rays in rea), if and only if for each xErea) 
W(x + 'ta) <!: W (x) for all scalars 't <!: O. 
This property of monotonicity along a-rays corresponds for a preference 
for higher incomes keeping a-ray invariant inequality constant. For any 
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aES, let Wa be the class of SEF satisfying continuity, population replication 
invariance, S-concavity and monotonicity along a-rays. 
1.4. A new concept of intermediate inequality 
In principle, given two distributions t, uED, we could search for 't* 
and a* so that u is a*-ray invariant inequality equivalent to t, that is, u = t 
+ 't* a*. Assume,' without loss of generality, that 't* ~ 0. Then people with 
equal or less demanding inequality views than a* would say that society is 
better off in u relative to t, while people with more demanding inequality 
views than a* would say that u and t are non-comparable. We do not 
follow that path for the following two reasons. First, in practice 't* is given 
by the total income difference between the two distributions under 
comparison, but we do not know how to find the vector a* for which u is 
statistically a*-ray invariant inequality equivalent to t. Second, even if 
such value judgement a* were to be found, it is not obvious how to 
interpret it. 
These problems do not affect our own inequality concept which 
will be presently introduced. We concentrate our attention on a-ray 
invariant inequality measures which can receive a clear economic 
interpretation. For that purpose, we start from an initial income 
distribution xoED, and a value of JtE[O, 1]. Then we consider only rays 
through xED constructed so that Jt per cent of any extra income is allocated 
to individuals according to income shares in xQt and (1 - Jt) per cent in 
equal absolute amounts. That is, we define 
PCXo, Jt)(x) = {yED: y = x + 't(Jtv Xo + (1 - Jt)e), 'tER}. 
Clearly, if we let a o = JtV Xo + (1 - Jt)e, then 
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Correspondingly, we define the subset ['(ao) of [(a 0) of income 
distributions along a p(xo, J't)(') ray, for which ao can represent a centrist 
inequality attitude: 
['(ao) = {xED: J't'v x + (1 - J't')e = ao for some J't'E[O, I]}. 
Clearly, for any xE['(ao), ao L v X' Then we say that a real valued function 
I(xo, J't): D - R is a (xQl J't)-inequality measure in ['(ao), if and only if it is 
the restriction to ['(ao) of the lao-ray invariant inequality measure. In this 
case, of course, 
or, what is the same, 
In general, the set ['(ao) is clearly non-empty(6), so that the (xo, J't)-
inequality measures are well defined. This means that they enjoy all the 
properties discussed by PS for a-ray invariant inequality measures. Given 
xoED, changes in income in the scale 't are allocated as a linear 
combination of the vectors e and v Xo in S. If we let Xo = (200,800) as before 
and J't = 0.5, then 50 per cent of all income differences are allocated 
according to the income shares vector (1/5, 4/5), and 50 percent in equal 
absolute amounts according to the proportions (1/2, 1/2). Thus, the (xQl J't)-
ray of income distributions through Xo is given by 
so that 100 extra units of income are allocated as (35, 65) to reach the new 
distribution (235, 865). On the other hand, notice that if J't = 1, (xQl J't)-
inequality becomes the relative view, whereas J't = 0 leads to the absolute 
VIew. 
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The dependence of centrist or intermediate inequality measures 
on an initial situation deserves to be emphasized. In our case, given xoED 
and n;E[D, I], a o = n;v Xo + (1- n;)e is determined. Then, for all yEr'(ao) there 
exists some n;'E[D, 1] such that ao = n;'vy + (1 - n;')e. Thus, (y, n;')-inequality 
coincides with (x(}1 n;)-inequality for all such yEr'(ao). The interpretation is 
clear. Suppose first that yEr'(ao) and Xo have the same (x(}1 n;)-inequality. 
Assume that Y' - Xo > D. Then, as we show in Proposition 1 in the 
Appendix, n;' ~ n;. This means that the same centrist attitude is captured 
when, starting from x(}1 n; per cent of all income exceeding Xo is allocated 
according to v Xo and (1 - n;) per cent in equal absolute amounts, as when, 
starting from y, n;' percent of the income difference Y - Xo is substracted 
from the individuals according to Vy and (1 - n;') in equal absolute 
amounts. This is undestandable, since y has a greater mean but the same 
centrist inequality as Xo and, therefore, less relative inequality. Thus, to get 
down to Xo from y so as to preserve intermediate inequality, we can follow 
the pattern v y more closely than the pattern v Xo from xo. On the other 
hand, suppose that yEr'(ao) and Xo have the same mean, but y, for 
instance, has greater or equal (x(}1 n;)-inequality than xo. Then, as we show 
in Proposition 1 in the Appendix, n;' :s n;. Now that y has greater relative 
inequality than x, to maintain the same centrist inequality from y, a 
smaller n;' per cent of all income exceeding Y must be allocated according 
to v y along the relative ray through y. 
In the 2-dimensional case, given any xoED and n;E[D, 11 all 
distributions y in nao)' where ao = n;v Xo + (1 - n;)e, haye the property that 
ao = n;'vy + (1 - n;')e for some n;'E[D, 1]. This means that r'(ao) and n a o) 
coincide, in which case the (xo. n;)-inequality and the ao-ray invariant 
inequality concepts also coincide. In general, of course, the set nao) is 
much richer than r'(ao). However, as we will see in the next section, the 
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structure posse sed by ['(ao) permits the new concept to be made 
operational. 
Finally, given xoED and 3tE[O, 1], so that a o = 3tV Xo + (1 - 3t)e, a 
SEF W: 0 -+ R is called monotonic along (xQl3t)-rays in r'(ao), if and only if 
W (x + 'Lao) ~ W (x) for all scalars 'L ~ ° and all xEr' (ao). 
This property of monotonicity along along (xQI 3t)-rays corresponds to a 
preference for higher incomes keeping (xQI 3t)-inequality constant. For any 
xoED and 3tE[O, 1], let W(xo, 3t) be the class of SEF satisfying continuity, 
population replication invariance, S-concavity and monotonicity along 
(x(}1 Jt)-rays. 
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II.OPERATIONALMETHODS 
II. 1. The homogeneous case 
An empirical situation in which intermediate inequality concepts 
might prove useful, arises in the presence of two income distributions t, 
uED such that u dominates in the relative Lorenz sense to t, but t 
dominates u in the absolute Lorenz sense. Define the absolute and the 
relative rays through t, A(t) and R(t), by 
A(t) ={xED: x = t + -ce,-c ER}, R(t) = {xED: x = t + -cv t, -c ER}, 
respectively. Let m(.) denote the function giving the income distribution 
mean, and let us call a and r the income distributions in A(t) and R(t), 
respectively, with mean m(u). Then, the starting situation will be 
described by the fact that va Lv u Lv!, The following theorem, inspired in 
Chakravarty (1988), summarizes the connection between Lorenz 
dominance and SEFs in the class W(t, Jt). 
Theorem 1. Let t, u ED such that va L Vu Lv!, Then the following 
statements are equivalent: 
(l.i) m( u) ~ m (t), and 
(l.ii) there exists some Jt#E[O, 1] such that, when we define 
we have Vu L v z. 
(2) W(u) ~ W (t) for all WEW(t, Jt#). 
Corollary. Under the conditions of the above Theorem, 
W (u) > W (t) for all WEW(t, Jt) with JtE(Jt#, 1]. 
Assume without loss of generality that -c* = U - T > 0, so that r = t + 
-c* v t and a = t + -c* e. Define the line segment {r, a} in H-dimensional space 
by 
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{r, a} = {zED: z = t +L*(nVt + (1 - n)e) for some nE[O,l]}. 
This is the subset of UuEQ(t)Eu(t) with the following structure: it consists 
of all income distributions with mean equal to m(u) which can be reached 
by (t, n)-rays through t. Assume first that the Lorenz dominance relation 
* 
va L Vu L v r is strict. Then there must exist two values n1 E[O, 1) and 
* * 
n2E[n1, 1] which induce the following partition of {r, a}: 
* * {a, zl} = {zE{r, a}: z = t + L* (n Vt + (1 - n)e), nE[D, n1 ]}; 
* * * * {zl' z2} = {zE{r, a}: z = t + L*(n Vt + (1- n)e), nE(n1, n2 )}; 
* * {z2' r} = {zE{r, a}: z = t + -c*(n Vt + (1- n)e), nE[n2, 1]}. 
The partition has the following property: 
* 
v z L Vu para todo zE{a, zl}; 
* 
Vu L Vz para todo ZE{z2' r}; 
* * 
v u is non-comparable to v z in the Lorenz sense for all zE {zl' z2}' 
Since, for instance, 
* * {a, zl} = UnE[D, n1] P(t, n)(t) n {z ED: m(z) = m(u)}, 
* * for every zE{a, zl}, l(t, n)(z) = l(t, n)(t) for some nE[O, n1]. Therefore, 
* let, n)(u) ~ l(t, n)(t) for all nE[D, n1]. 
Similarly, 
* let, n)(u) S ICt, n)(t) for all nE[n2, 1], 
* * 
while for any nE(n1, n2 ), u and t are non comparable from the point of 
view of Ct, n)-inequality. Notice that if Vu is statiistically equivalent to Vz 
* * in the Lorenz sense, then n1 = n2 = n* with z = t + L* (n* v t + (1 - n* )e). In 
this case 
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* * Finally, if va is Lorenz equivalent to vu' then 31:1 = 31:2 = 0; but if va 
* is non comparable to vu' then there exists no Jt1 E[O, 1]. Similarly, if Vu is 
* * Lorenz equivalent to v t' then Jt1 = Jt2 = 1, while if v u is non comparable to 
* Vt, then there exists no Jt2E[O, 1]. 
11.2. The heterogeneous case 
Let us now admit that we have a population of h = 1, ... ,H 
households which can differ in income, xh, and / or a vector of household 
characteristics. In this paper, households of the same size are assumed to 
have the same needs and, therefore, their incomes will be directly 
comparable. Larger households have greater needs, but also greater 
opportunities to achieve economies of scale in consumption. Assume that 
there are K = 1, ... ,K household sizes. Following Coulter et al (1992a, 1992b), 
for each household h of size K define adjusted income in the relative case 
When e = 0, adjusted income coincides with unadjusted household 
income, while if e = 1, it equals per capita household income. Taking a 
single adult as the reference type, the expression K e can be interpreted as 
the number of equivalent adults in a household of size K. Thus, the 
greater is e, the smaller are the economies of scale within the household 
or the larger is the number of equivalent adults. Notice that, given e, the 
number of equivalent adults is a non linear increasing function of K. 
In the absolute case, given e, for each household h of size K define 
adjusted income by 
w here A K is such 
It is easy to see that 
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The parameter A K can be interpreted as the cost of an adult when 
household size is K. Of course, the greater is S, the greater is A K and the 
smaller are the economies of scale within the household. 
Notice that, if I is any index of relative inequality, for each K 
Similarly, if A is any index of absolute inequality 
Thus, in both cases, within each ethically homogeneous subgroup, the 
inequality of adjusted income is equal to the inequality of original income, 
independently of individual incomes and prices. 
We now extend this adjustment procedure to the (XK, Jt)-
inequality case. Let XK and HK be the total income and the number of 
households of size K. Given Jt and S, for each household h of size K define 
adjusted income by 
where "[K is such 
Equi valently, 
zh(,,[K) = Jt(zh(S» + (1 - Jt)(zh(A K». 
It can be shown that 
Again, the greater is S, the greater is "[K and the smaller are the economies 
of scale within the household. Finally, if for every Jt and every XK, I(xK, Jt) 
is any index of (XK, Jt)-inequality, we have 
17 
Ill. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
111.1. The data 
Our data come from two household budget surveys, the Encllestas 
de Presllpllestos Familiares (EPF for short), collected by the Instituto 
Naciollal de Estad{stica (lNE for short) in 1980-81 and 1990-91. The EPFs are 
large, comparable surveys of 23.972 and 21.155 observations, respectively, 
for a population of approximately 10 or 11 million households. The basic 
demographic information is in Table 1. Household and personal 
distributions have been estimated taking into account the blowing up 
factors provided by the surveys. 
TABLE 1. Household and personal population by household size in 1980-81 and 1990-91 
1980-81 1990-91 
Household 
size Households % Persons % Households % Persons % 
1 person 779.135 7.8 779.135 2.1 1.128.990 10.0 1.128.990 2.9 
2 persons 2.116.476 21.1 4.232.951 11.4 2.519.291 22.3 5.038.581 13.1 
3 persons 1.866.104 18.6 5.598.312 15.1 2.347.041 20.8 7.041.124 18.3 
4 persons 2.364.574 23.6 9.458.297 25.5 2.821.017 25.0 11.284.067 29.3 
5 persons 1.490.503 14.9 7.452.513 20.1 1.493.602 13.2 7.468.011 19.4 
6 persons 774.309 7.7 4.645.852 12.5 614.983 5.4 3.689.897 9.7 
7 persons 359.818 3.6 2.518.725 6.8 245.154 2.2 1.716.075 4.5 
8ormore 271.414 2.7 2.383.123 6.4 128.432 1.1 1.127.260 2.9 
All 10.022.332 100.0 37.068.908 100.0 11.298.509 100.0 38.494.006 100.0 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Smaller households, consisting of 1 to 4 persons, are more 
important at the end of the decade, and the opposite is the case for larger 
households.Thus, whereas the household population grows by more than 
10 per cent, the number of person increases only by approximately 4 per 
cent. Correspondingly, household size decreases from 3.7 in 1980-81 to 3.41 
in 1990-91. 
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For reasons spelled out elsewhere(7), we believe that household 
welfare is best approximated by a measure of current consumption, 
namely, household total current expenditure on private goods and 
services, net of expenditures on the acquisition of certain durables, but 
inclusive of imputations for self-consumption, wages in kind, meals 
subsidised at work, and the rental value for owner-occupied and other non 
rental housing. We express total hoshold expenditure at constant prices of 
the Winter of 1991 by means of household specific statistical price indices. 
111.2. Previous results in Del Rio y Ruiz-Castillo (1995) 
Table 2 contains the percentage change in real terms of household 
expenditures for households of different size. Table 3 presents the 
corresponding information for two distributions: the distribution of 
household expenditure, adjusted for household size, and the distribution 
in which each person is assigned the adjusted expenditure of the 
household to which she belongs. In both cases, the change in the mean is 
given as a function of the parameter 8, which determines the weight we 
give to household size in the definition of household adjusted 
expenditure: zh(8) = xh /K8 , SE[O,l], where xh is original household 
expendi ture and K is household size. 
TABLE 2. Percentage change in the mean of household expenditure in real terms, by 
household size 
Number of persons: 1 2 3 4 
In%: 37.8 27.3 28.3 32.5 
5 
28.8 
6 
29.2 
7 8 or more 
17.8 25.1 
TABLE 3. Percentage change in the mean of adjusted household expenditure in real terms as 
a function of 8 (the greater 8 is, the smaller the economies of scale in consumption) 
8= 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.0 
Households 24.2 26.2 28.2 31.2 34.3 
Persons 23.8 26.0 28.3 31.6 34.8 
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From the point of view of efficiency, it is quite clear that there has 
been an important improvement over the decade for all household types. 
Single person households and the large group of 4-person households, 
experiment an increase above 30 per cent. At the opposite side, large 
households of 7 or more persons grow only between 17 and 25 per cent. 
The increase for all other households is in the 27-29 range. For the 
population as a whole, the rates of growth are quite similar for households 
and persons. In both cases, the smaller the economies of scale, the greater 
the growth in mean adjusted expenditure, which varies between 24 and 34 
percentage change. 
As far as inequality is concerned, the mam findings are as 
follows: (i) There has been an statistically significant reduction in relative 
inequality at constant prices. Therefore, real aggregate welfare has 
improved for all SEFs in the class WR . This result is robust to the 
parametrization of the weight to be given to economies of scale, the unit 
of analysis -the household or the person- and the scale variable used to 
approximate the household standard of living. (ii) Although these results 
are also obtained for every subgroup in the partition by household size, 
smaller households (up to 3 persons) show greater improvements. (iii) 
There has been an increase in absolute inequality, both for the population 
as a whole and for every subgroup within the partition by household size. 
111.3. Results on intermediate inequality: the homogeneous case 
The results just summarized provide us with a text-book example 
demanding for an application of a centrist approach. We start with the 
analysis of each subgroup in the partition by household size. Let us denote 
by t and u the 1980-81 and 1990-91 distributions, respectively. We have just 
seen that u has a greater mean than t for all subgroups. In terms of the 
notation introduced in Section 11, we must search for a pair of values 0 s 
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* * 1tl s 1t2 s I, where at least the first or the last inequality is strict. The 
purpose is to establish that: 
- t y u are statistically non comparable from the point of view of (t, 
* * 1t)-inequality for all1tE(1t1,1t2); 
* 
- t has less or equal (t, 1t)-inequality than u for allnE[O, 3t1] 
* 
,- t has more or equal (t,1t)-inequality than u for all 1tE[3t2 , 1]. 
Then we may conclude that 
(i) t has less welfare than u for all SEF in the class W(t, 1t) for 
* 
all 3tE[ 3t1 ' 1]; 
(ii) t is non comparable to u for all SEF in the class W(t, 1t) for 
* 
all 3tE[O, 1t1]. 
The results are in Table 4. Household sizes are ordered, first, by the 
* * 
minimum 1t2 value, then by the minimum 1[1 value. ' 
TABLE 4. Intermediate inequality within the basic partition:1980-81 vs. 1990-91' 
* * 
Household size 1t2 1t1 
3 persons 0.82 0.52 
1 person 0.85 0.75 
2 persons 0.89 0.67 
5 persons 0.99 0.64 
7 persons 1.00 0.18 
6 persons 1.00 0.66 
4 persons 1.00 0.85 
Let us comment on 3 person households. For the range [0.82, 1] of 
1[ values, the (t, 1t)-inequality at t is greater than at u. Since the mean is 
greater at u, by 28.33 to be exact, the social welfare of 3 person households 
has increased unambigously for that range of centrist attitudes to 
inequality. For the range [O~ 0.52] of 1t values, the (t, 1t)-inequality at t is 
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smaller than at u. Therefore, there is nothing we can say about social 
welfare for this range. 
111.4. Results on intermediate inequality: the heterogeneous case 
Naturally, all results presented in Table 5 are in terms of of e 
parameter values, corresponding to different assumptions on the 
importance of e~onomies of scale in the definition of adjusted household 
expenditure. 
TABLE 5. Intermediate inequality for the population as a whole as a function of e 
Households Persons 
* * * * 
31:2 31:1 31:2 31:1 
e =0.0 0.92 0.81 0.91 0.78 
e =0.2 0.90 0.78 0.91 0.75 
e =0.4 0.89 0.75 0.89 0.74 
e =0.7 0.88 0.76 0.89 0.75 
e = 1.0 0.91 0.79 0.90 0.78 
The two main conclusions are clear. In the first place, as e grows 
and we diminish the importance of economies of scale, there is an 
improvement in intermediate inequality, until we reach the last interval 
when e goes from 0.7 to I, in which case there is a slight deterioration in 
inequality. In the second place, the differences obtained with the 
household or the personal distributions are practically negligible. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Present empirical methods, pioneered by Shorrocks (1983), allow 
us to test whether an income distribution y unambigously provides 
greater social welfare than distribution x according to all members of two 
wide classes of SEFs. The two classes differ in the way a preference for 
higher incomes IS made compatible with the invariance of either relative 
or absolute inequality. 
Assume that relative to x, we have found with this methodology 
that income distribution y has greater mean income, less relative 
inequality, but more absolute inequality. This is exactly the case when x 
and yare taken to be, respectively, the 1980-81 and 1990-91 household 
expenditure distributions, adjusted for household size, after a decade of 
socialist governments in Spain. What present methods cannot say is 
whether the improvement in relative inequality (or the worsening of 
absolute inequality) is "large" or "small". 
We believe the previous example provides good reasons to 
inmerse oneself in the continuum of centrist or intermediate inequality 
notions. The question can now be rephrased: for what type of centrist 
attitudes towards inequality the situation in 1990-91 in Spain is statistically 
equivalent or non comparable to the situation in 1980-81? An answer will 
tell us also for what type of centrist attitudes there has been an 
improvement, and for what type a worsening in inequality. 
To provide such an answer, in this paper we introduce a centrist or 
intermediate (x, rt)-inequality concept, where x is an initial income 
distribution and rt a parameter which takes values in the unit interval. 
Technically, it is seen to be a variant of the a-ray invariant inequality 
concept proposed by Pfingsten and Seidl (1994). In practice, it has two 
advantages. (i) The first is that it has a clear economic interpretation. We 
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say that x and y have the same (x, rr)-inequality if the total income 
difference between the two distributions is allocated among the indivuals 
as follows: :n; percent preserving income shares in x, and (1 - :n;) percent in 
equal absolute amounts. (ii) The second advantage is that it can be made 
operational in the Shorrocks way. Specifically, given a situation like the 
Spanish one, the data reveal the range of :n; values for which the 1990-91 
household expenditure distribution provides a greater social welfare, in 
terms of both the mean and (x, :n;)-inequality, than the 1980-81 
distribution. 
Whether social welfare went unambigously up or down according 
to measurement instruments consistent with a relative or an absolute 
inequality notion, is a very important piece of knowledge to have. 
However, in situations like the Spanish one, to know precisely under 
which set of centrist value judgements inequality was unchanged, 
increased or reduced, provides some value added worth having. In our 
opinion, the methodology presented in this paper goes one step in the 
direction pointed out by Atkinson (1989), when he indicates that we ought 
to follow procedures and, above all, report empirical estimates, making 
clear their dependence on the various axioms and value judgements 
involved. 
For the record, according to the EPFs, during the 80's (i) Spain has 
experienced an important increase in mean household expenditure, 
ranging from 24 to 34 per cent in real terms, depending on our hypothesis 
about the economies of scale in consumption due to. household size. (ii) 
For the population as a whole, when economies of scale in consumption 
are rather important, the range of :n; values for which the 1990-91 
distribution has a smaller (x, :n;)-inequality is (0.90, 1) for both the 
unweighted case and the case in which households are weighted by 
household size. (iii) Each subgroup in the basic partition has also smaller 
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(x, Jt)-inequality in 1990-91. In the subgroup of 3 person households, for 
which the improvement is greatest, the range of Jt values for which this 
is the case is (0.82, 1). 
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NOTES 
(1) Moyes (1987) develops analogous criteria, based on absolute 
Lorenz curves, to establish whether one distribution is unambigously 
better than another according to all SEFs in W A. 
(2) For example, see Amiel and Cowell (1992) and Harrison and 
Seidl (1990). In the Spanish case, Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo (1993) found 
that, for the subsample that showed an acceptable degree of consistency 
over the questionnaire, only 31 percent supported a relative view of 
inequality, 24 percent supported an absolute view, and 27 percent an 
intermediate notion (the rest supported other extreme views). 
(3) For the shortcomings of Bossert and Pfingsten ~l-inequality 
concept and Kolm's centrist y-inequality measure, we refer to PS's 
discussion. 
(4) Alternatively, the data reveal the range of 1t values for which 
the two income distribution x has less or more (y, 1t)-inequality than 
distribution y. As we will see, both inequality concepts represent exactly 
the same centrist attitude toward inequality. 
(5) See Beach and Davidson (1983) and, for applications, Bishop et 
al (1989). 
(6) Similarly, the subset Q'(xo) of Q(xo), defined by Q'(xo) = luES: u 
= 1t'V Xo + (1 - 1t')e for some 1t'E[O, I]}, is also non-empty. 
(7) See for instance Del Rio and Ruiz-Castillo (1995) and references 
quoted there. 
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APPENDIX 
A. Proposition 1. 
Let x,ye['(aoJ and aoeS, where ao=1tvx+(l-1t)efor some 1te[O,I]. If 
xLy (yLx) then the value of 1t which satisfies ao=1t 'vy + (l-1t 'ye is such that 
1t':::;1t (1t'~1t). 
Proof: 
By contradiction, suppose that 1t' > 1t. This means 1t = 1t + E, E > 0 
being. Consider x,ye [' (ao), therefore, we can write 
By substituting 1t' in this expression we obtain 
1tVz + (1-1t) e = 1tVy + (1-1t) e+ (vy-e)€ . 
This implies that v / > v/for the rich (v / > (1 IH» and that v x h < v/for 
the poor (v/< (l/H», in the y distribution. We can conclude that x can be 
obtained from y by transferring income from the poor to the rich. And thus 
gives us yLx, a contradiction. 
B. Proof of Theorem 1. 
1) ~ 2): 
As m(u)~m(t), for any SEF, WeW(t.rt#) it must be verified: 
W(z) = w(t+ (U-T) (1t Il V t +(l-1t Il ) e)) ~ W(t) . 
Q.E.D. 
Moreover, as u Lorenz-dominates z and both distributions have the same 
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mean, m(u), by Dasgupta-Sen-Starret (1973) we know that for any S-Concave 
function, W 
W(u) ~ W(z) . 
By combining these two expressions we conclude that 
W(u) ~ W(t) . 
2) => 1): 
Let us suppose that 
where z' =x+(U-X)[1t#vt + (1-1th)e], n~O, and f(.) is a S-concave function. It 
can be prove that for any function W verifying (**): 
holds for any 't' E R In fact, for 't' > 0, this means m(x) + ('t '/H) ~ m(x), it can 
be shown 
Notice that S-concavity of/also implies S-concavity of W. Therefore, 
expression (**) warranties that function W(.) satisfies the assumptions of the 
theorem. Now then, knowing that W(t)~W(u), and choosing.f(.) = 1 we obtain 
condition (1. i): 
W(t) = (m(t))n ~ (m(u))n = W(u) • 
On the other hand, if n=O we get 
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W(t) = f[ZI] = f[z] ~ f[u] = W(u) . 
As z and u have the same mean, m(u) >0, and/(.) being any arbitrary 
S-concave function, by Dasgupta-Sen-Starret (1973), this means that u Lorenz-
dominates z. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Corollary: 
If 7tE(7t#,l] we can write 7t#=7t-~, for some ~ElR. Then, 
1t#Vt +(l-1t#)e = 1tVt +(l-1t)e-p(vt -e) . 
It can be shown that 7t#Vt + (l-7t#)e is obtained from 7tVt + (l-7t)e by using 
a sequence of rank preserving transformations transferring income from the 
rich to the poor, in a proportionally way: (vce). Then, 7t#Vt+(1-7t~e strictly 
dominates 7tVt+(1-7t)e in the Lorenz sense. And therefore, using that 
z' = t+t [1tVt + (1-1t) e) I t = U-T I 
this demonstrates that Vz strictly dominates Vz ' in the Lorenz sense. Therefore, 
under the assumptions of Theorem 1: 
W(t) = W(z') < W(z) ~ W(u) I 
must hold for any function WEW(t,1t), with 7tE(7t#,1]. 
Q.E.D. 
29 
REFERENCES 
Amiel, Y. and F. A. Cowell (1992), "Measurement of Income Inequality. 
Experimental Test by Questionnaire," Journal of Public Economics, 47: 3-
26. 
Atkinson, A. B. (1989), "Measuring Inequality and Differing Value 
Judgements," ESRC Programme on Taxation, Incentives, and the 
Distribution of Income, Discussion Paper, 129. 
Ballano, C. and J. Ruiz-Castillo (1992), "Searching by Questionnaire for the 
Meaning of Income Inequality," Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 
Departamento de Economia, Working papers, 92-43. 
Beach, C. M. and R. Davidson (1983), "Distribution-Free Statistical 
Inference with Lorenz Curves and Income Shares," 50: 723-735. 
Bishop, J., J. Formby and P. Thistle (1989), "Statistical Inference, Income 
Distributions, and Social Welfare," in D. J. Slotje (ed), Research on 
Ecollomic Inequality, Vol I , Greenwich, er: Jay Press. 
Bossert, W. and A. Pfingsten (1990), "Intermediate Inequality: Concepts, 
Indices, and Welfare Implications," Mathematical Social Sciences, 19: 117-
134. 
Chakravarty, S. (1988), "On Quasi-Orderings of Income Profiles," 
University of Paderborn, Methods of Operations Research, 60, XIII 
Symposium on Operations Research. 
Coulter, F., F. Cowell and S. Jenkins (1992a), "Differences in Needs and 
Assessment of Income Distributions," Bulletin of Economic Research, 44: 
77-124. 
Coulter, F., F. Cowell and S. Jenkins (1992b), "Equivalence Scale 
Relativities and the Extent of Inequality and Poverty," Economic Journal, 
102: 1067-1082. 
30 
Dasgupta, P., A. Sen and D. Starret (1973), "Notes on the Measurement of 
Inequality," Journal of Ecollomic Theory, 6: 180-187. 
Del Rio, C. and J. Ruiz-Castillo (1995), "Ordenaci6n del bienestar e 
inferencia estadistica. El caso de las EPF de 1980-81 y 1990-91", Universidad 
Carlos In de Madrid, Documento de Trabajo 95-10, Serie Economia 08, 
forthcoming in L. Gutierrez and J.M. Maravall (eds.)," Segundo Simposio 
sobre la distribllcioll de la renta y la riqlleza", Fundaci6n Argentaria, 
Madrid. 
Harrison, E. and C. Seidl (1990), "Acceptance of Distributional Axioms: 
Experimental Findings," in W. Eichorn (ed), Models and Measurement of 
Welfare alld Inequality. 
Moyes, P. (1987), "A New Concept of Lorenz Domination," Economic 
Letters, 23: 203-207. 
Kolm, S. C. (1976a), "Unequal Inequalities I," Journal of Economic Theory, 
12: 416-442. 
Kolm, S. C. (1976b), "Unequal Inequalities Il," Journal of Economic Theory, 
13: 82-111. 
Pfingsten, A. and C. Seidl (1994), "Ray Invariant Inequality Measures," 
mimeo. 
Shorrocks, A. (1983), "Ranking Income Distributions," Economica, 50: 3-17. 
Ruiz-Castillo, J. (1995a), "The Anatomy of Money and Real Inequality in 
Spain: 1973-74 to 1980-81," Journal of Income Distribution, 4: 
31 
WORKING PAPERS 1996 
Economics Series 
96-01 (01) Praveen Kujal and Roland Michelitsch 
"Market power, inelastic elasticity of demand, and terms of trade" 
96-02(02) Emmanuel Petrakis and Minas Vlassis 
"Endogenous wage-bargaining institutions in oligopolistic industries" 
, 
96-03(03) Coral del Rio and Javier Ruiz-Castillo 
"Intermediate inequality and welfare. The case of Spain, 1980-81 to 1990-91" 
